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This paper derives closed-form solutions for values of debt and equity in a continuous-
time structural model in which the demands of creditors to be repaid cause a firm to be put
into bankruptcy. This allows discussion of the effect of creditor coordination in recovering
money on the values of debt, equity, and the firm, as well as on optimal capital structure.
The effects of features of bankruptcy codes that prevent coordination failures between cred-
itors, such as automatic stays and preference law, are also considered. The model suggests
that such features, while preventing coordination failures, can decrease welfare.
I. Introduction
Leland (1994) argues that the decision to put a firm into bankruptcy de-
pends on the value of its debt and the value of its equity, and that in turn, the
values of debt and equity of a firm depend on when that firm will be put into
bankruptcy. Therefore, models need to solve for the optimal decision to put a firm
into bankruptcy and the values of debt and equity jointly. In Leland’s approach,
the firm promises a perpetual coupon payment to debt holders. The assumption is
that if a coupon payment is missed, the firm is put into bankruptcy immediately.
In this kind of framework, bankruptcy happens when the equity holder optimally
decides to stop injecting funds to ensure that coupons are paid in full.
However, some firms do in practice miss coupon payments without being put
into bankruptcy immediately. For example, Varma and Cantor (2005) report that
of slightly more than 1,000 “initial default events” recorded by Moody’s for the
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period 1983–2003, more than 55% consist of missed interest payments and grace
period defaults, which occur when firms are not in formal bankruptcy (the remain-
ing cases are direct Chapter 11 filings, distressed exchanges, missed principals,
direct Chapter 7 filings, and Chapter 11 prepacks).
Once payments are missed, the most important provision of a debt contract,
the provision to make timely payments, has been breached. In this kind of situa-
tion, bankruptcy can happen when creditors decide to take legal steps to demand
repayment.1 Furthermore, whether or not creditors will be able to coordinate will
matter, and hence features of bankruptcy codes such as automatic stays and pref-
erence law that affect the coordination of creditors will matter. This paper asks the
following questions: How are the values of debt, equity, and the firm affected if it
is the decision of creditors to demand repayment that causes bankruptcy? How do
features of bankruptcy codes such as automatic stays, preference law, and a policy
of equality of distributions to creditors affect creditor coordination, the decision
to demand repayment, and hence the values of debt, equity, and the firm? How do
they affect optimal capital structure and welfare? The paper presents answers to
these questions in the context of a continuous-time structural model of debt and
equity that produces closed-form values of debt, equity, and the firm.
In the model, the equity holder cannot inject funds, and default happens when
cash flows are insufficient to make the coupon payments. The equity holder does
not receive a bankruptcy payoff, and therefore has incentives to gamble for resur-
rection (i.e., to delay putting the firm into bankruptcy as long as possible). Once
the firm is in default, creditors have a right to demand full payment, either col-
lectively or individually. Successful legal action of creditors leads to bankruptcy,
which is taken to be synonymous with liquidation.2 The model considers different
outcomes that might arise depending on whether or not creditors can coordinate.
First consider the case in which creditors cannot coordinate. Then the fea-
tures of bankruptcy codes that affect creditor coordination such as automatic
stays, preference law, and equality of distributions are important. To develop
an intuition about the effect of such features, I first discuss how uncoordinated
creditors would interact in the absence of these features, and then I discuss how
uncoordinated creditors interact in the presence of such features.
When creditors cannot coordinate, they will compare the costs and bene-
fits of individually grabbing assets to decide when to act, taking into account the
possible actions of other creditors. Consider initially the case in which automatic
stays and preference law do not apply, and there is no policy of equality of distri-
butions to creditors. Suppose that whenever the firm is defaulting on at least some
of the promised interest payments on its debt, creditors have to decide whether
to individually hire a costly lawyer who will attempt to obtain a judgment lien
(i.e., attempt to grab assets). In doing so, they consider the probability of being
1For example, LoPucki (1983) provides empirical evidence that this in fact happens in practice.
2The majority of bankruptcy filings in the United States are Chapter 7 filings (bankruptcy liqui-
dation) as opposed to Chapter 11 (bankruptcy reorganization). For example, the News Release of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts of Nov. 14, 2003, reports that 21,008 businesses filed for
Chapter 7 in the fiscal year 2003, whereas only 9,185 filed for Chapter 11. Chapter 11 (bankruptcy
organization) is discussed informally in Section II.B. A formal discussion in the given framework is
likely to be a fruitful area for future research.
Bruche 1409
successful in recovering money, which is assumed to depend negatively on the
cash available to the firm, and the number of other creditors filing claims; if many
creditors file claims and the firm does not have sufficient cash to fight in court, it
will be liquidated. Creditors who did file claims will receive a higher liquidation
payoff. If few creditors file claims and the firm has sufficient cash to fight in court,
the creditors who did file claims have to pay their lawyers but are unsuccessful in
grabbing assets.
The central features of this game are strategic complementarities and im-
perfect information about the actions of other creditors.3 They produce a critical
point that describes how much default creditors are willing to tolerate before a
sufficient number of them will attempt to grab assets such that the firm is liqui-
dated. The location of this critical point is determined by the payoffs in the game.
For example, for very low legal costs of grabbing assets, individual creditors rush
to grab assets very early.
Now consider the case in which automatic stays and preference law do apply,
and there is a policy of equality of distributions to creditors. This changes the pay-
offs of individual creditors. Once a sufficient number of creditors file claims, the
firm is put into bankruptcy, an automatic stay applies to most creditors, and pref-
erence law ensures that most of the money previously obtained by creditors has
to be returned to the trustee, to be shared equally among creditors. This reduces
incentives to grab assets individually, leading to later liquidation.
Is this later liquidation always a good thing? In the model, there is an opti-
mal point to liquidate the firm, optimal in the sense that liquidating at this point
maximizes firm value. The point at which uncoordinated creditors liquidate a firm
in an asset grab can lie either above or below that point (i.e., uncoordinated cred-
itors can produce liquidation that is “too early,” or “too late”) depending on their
incentives to grab assets.
Now consider the benchmark case when creditors can coordinate. In con-
trast to the case when they cannot coordinate, the features of bankruptcy codes
that affect creditor coordination are not important. Coordinated creditors will try
to select the time to grab assets to maximize the value of debt. If the share of the
liquidation value that goes to creditors is large, creditors will always want the firm
to be liquidated “too early.”4 Compared to this benchmark case, a lack of coordi-
nation between creditors can increase firm value if it leads to later liquidation, but
it will always decrease firm value if it leads to even earlier liquidation.
The model also suggests that incentives to grab assets affect optimal capital
structure. Consider a standard debt-equity trade-off between a tax advantage and
expected financial distress costs. In addition to this, when deciding on the optimal
level of debt, agents now also need to consider the effect of the level of debt on
firm value via liquidation timing: Since the critical point at which the firm is
3A technical contribution of the paper is proposing a way of integrating a private information
game in a standard continuous-time public-information pricing model with a single filtration via some
specific assumptions on the timing of the game.
4Here, the model is a good representation of environments in which creditors have large influence
over the timing of liquidation, such as, for example, in the United Kingdom, where floating charge
holders can (and often do) cause liquidation of a firm.
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liquidated depends on how much default creditors tolerate, and how much default
creditors tolerate for a given cash flow is a function of how much debt has been
issued, the cash flow at which the firm is liquidated is also a function of the level
of debt.
In the model, optimal leverage can be a nonmonotonic function of incentives
to grab assets. Low incentives to grab assets mean late liquidation, which makes
debt somewhat unattractive and medium leverage optimal. Medium incentives to
grab assets mean slightly earlier liquidation, which makes debt more attractive
and high leverage optimal. High incentives to grab assets mean early liquidation,
which makes debt very unattractive and low leverage optimal. Since the incentives
to grab assets that a given bankruptcy code produces are related to “creditor rights
scores” such as that of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998),
which contain information on, for example, whether or not automatic stays apply
in a given country, this is a testable implication of the model.
In terms of welfare, the model suggests that bankruptcy codes that strongly
disincentivize asset grabs can decrease welfare (for any welfare function that
attaches some positive weights to firm values and expected tax revenues). The
argument is as follows: Strong disincentives against asset grabs lead to very late
liquidation, which reduces firm value. Weaker disincentives mean earlier liqui-
dation, which can improve firm value. Earlier liquidation also has 2 effects on
expected tax revenues: Earlier liquidation means the firm is likely to pay taxes
for a shorter time. At the same time, however, earlier liquidation can imply lower
optimal leverage, which means a lower tax shield, and hence higher tax revenues
while it is paying. Overall, the 2nd effect can outweigh the 1st effect, and there
are situations in which earlier liquidation increases expected tax revenues. So
weaker disincentives to grab assets can increase both firm value and expected tax
revenues.
Related Literature
In terms of the dynamic pricing literature, the model presented here is related
to those of Leland (1994) and other papers that propose extensions of Leland’s
model. For example, Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan (2007) or Franc¸ois and
Morellec (2004) augment the Leland model by allowing for a period prior to liq-
uidation in which the firm defaults on payments, which they label as (Chapter
11-type) bankruptcy; this happens when the asset value falls below a bankruptcy
barrier that is endogenously determined and chosen by equity holders. Franc¸ois
and Morellec assume that the firm is liquidated once it has spent enough time
below the bankruptcy boundary.5 In the model of Broadie et al., liquidation hap-
pens at an ex post optimal liquidation boundary below the bankruptcy boundary,
or if the firm spends a sufficient amount of time under the bankruptcy bound-
ary. In contrast, the model in this paper follows the approach of Naqvi (2008), in
which negative dividends or asset sales are not allowed, which implies default oc-
curs when cash flows are insufficient to cover coupon payments. In this approach,
5Generalizations of this approach are considered by Moraux (2002) and Galai, Raviv, and Wiener
(2007).
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default is not synonymous with bankruptcy, and efforts to collect on debt are
closely related to the actual incidence of liquidation.
The model here is also related to dynamic pricing models that incorporate
strategic debt service games or renegotiation games as in the papers of Anderson
and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997).6 In practice, the
possibility of renegotiation between equity holders and creditors can be an impor-
tant additional factor determining actual liquidation outcomes, over and above the
decision of creditors to collect on their debt. In order to focus on the decision of
creditors to collect on the debt, how the ability to coordinate influences this deci-
sion, and how features of bankruptcy codes influence incentives to collect individ-
ually, however, the model presented in this paper considers a situation in which
renegotiation or strategic debt service is not possible. This is useful not only for
understanding what might drive liquidation outcomes in situations in which rene-
gotiating costs would be prohibitively high, but also possibly for understanding
the bargaining positions of the parties in renegotiation.
The model here is also related to some papers outside the dynamic pricing
literature. The asset grab game is a variant of a model that has been used in the
context of (static) debt pricing by Morris and Shin (2004), which in turn is closely
related to models used, for example, in the context of currency crises (Morris and
Shin (1998)) or bank runs (e.g., Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)).7 Papers that ex-
amine creditor coordination include the paper by Gertner and Scharfstein (1991),
which looks at the aggregate effects of individually optimal decisions to accept an
exchange offer. In contrast, here the focus is on the decision to individually col-
lect on debt on which a firm is defaulting. Furthermore, Bolton and Scharfstein
(1996) examine a model in which inefficiencies in liquidation or renegotiation that
are the result of having a large number of creditors can reduce moral hazard; and
Bris and Welch (2005) look at how free riding in debt collection efforts between
uncoordinated creditors can be beneficial in reducing socially wasteful expendi-
tures that result from equity holders and debt holders fighting over the liquida-
tion value of the firm. Papers that examine the relationship between capital struc-
ture and liquidation decisions include that by Titman (1984). However, he only
considers the case that would correspond to the benchmark case of coordinated
creditors here.
In the next sections, a discrete-time model of an asset grab game between
uncoordinated creditors is presented (Section II), and its solution is sketched
(Section III). With this discrete-time solution, values of debt and equity cannot
be calculated in closed form. (This means, for instance, that in the discrete-time
model, it is not possible to consider the benchmark case of coordinated credi-
tors who time their asset grab to maximize the value of debt.) In order to allow
valuation, the continuous-time limit is taken. Section IV then reports and dis-
cusses the liquidation outcomes in the case of uncoordinated creditors, and com-
pares this with the liquidation outcomes in the (benchmark) case of coordinated
6Other versions of renegotiation games are considered (e.g., by Mella-Barral (1999), Fan and
Sundaresan (2000), Hege and Mella-Barral (2005), or Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007)).
7See also Morris and Shin (2003) for a survey of these models.
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creditors. Section V discusses the implications of the coordination of creditors for
the optimal capital structure and welfare. Section VI concludes.
II. The Model
Time is discrete and increases in steps of size ∆. A firm engages in a pro-
ductive activity that uses a single productive asset and generates cash flow (net of
costs) until the firm is liquidated (i.e., the productive asset is sold). The cash flow
at time t is xt∆, where xt evolves according to the following stochastic process:





Here, the rate of growth of xt (i.e., (xt+! " xt)/xt) has a deterministic component
that is a sum of a risk premium σν and a parameter µ, and normally distributed
disturbance term ηt+!, with mean 0 and variance σ2∆. Here, µ and σ are con-
stants, and ν is (potentially) a function of the state variable xt and time. There is a
risk-free asset that pays a constant rate of return r∆, where 0 < r < µ.
The firm is initially set up with equity and debt; debt is issued with a promised
perpetual coupon of c∆ per time period. At periods in which the cash flow xt∆
is sufficient to pay the coupon, the coupon is paid in full, and any remainder is
paid out to the equity holder as a dividend. The equity holder pays taxes at rate τ
on this dividend; for simplicity, debt is assumed not to be taxed.8 When the cash
flow xt∆ is insufficient to pay the coupon, creditors receive the cash flow (net of
a financial distress cost) in partial payment of the coupon, and the equity holder
receives nothing (i.e., the firm partially defaults on coupon payments). I assume
that the financial distress cost is a fraction λ # (0, 1) of the cash flow xt∆, such
that the cash flow that creditors receive when the firm defaults is (1"λ)xt∆. (The
presence of a tax on dividends and financial distress costs will produce a standard
debt-equity trade-off in the model.)
This setup ignores that defaults have to be cured (i.e., when the debtor is in
arrears, interest payments that have been missed have to be paid at a later date if a
sufficient amount of money becomes available) and is therefore an approximation.9
The setup also assumes that the equity holders do not inject cash to prevent
default. This assumption could be relaxed without overly affecting results, at the
cost of a substantial increase in model complexity.10
8Here, ! should therefore be interpreted as a net tax advantage to debt in the sense of Miller
(1977).
9Although allowing for cures would make the model more realistic, there is a trade-off in terms
of complexity versus obtaining closed-form solutions, since introducing cures would introduce path
dependency. The model of Broadie et al. (2007) is an example of a similar model that allows for cures
but can only be solved numerically.
10Bruche and Naqvi (2010) develop a similar model in which the equity holder (acting as a Stack-
elberg leader) decides how long to prevent default by injecting cash, and the (coordinated) creditors
subsequently decide when to liquidate the firm once it is defaulting. In this framework, the equity
holder weighs two things when deciding how long to inject cash to prevent default: On the one hand,
defaulting earlier means saving more cash; on the other hand, defaulting earlier means giving more
incentives to creditors to liquidate. In the model, the equity holder will in general inject some cash to
prevent default, but coordinated creditors will still want to liquidate prematurely. Moreover, for plau-
sible parameter values, the “saving cash” motive is dominant, meaning that default happens almost
immediately after cash flows are insufficient to pay coupons.
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If the firm is liquidated, the productive asset is sold, that is, the cash flows are
swapped irreversibly for a constant liquidation value K > 0, of which a fraction
s > 0 covers legal costs, such that the net liquidation value is (1 " s)K. Note
that choosing a constant liquidation value rather than arguing that the liquidation
value is a fraction of the preliquidation going-concern value of the firm, as is often
done in the literature, is significant in that it means that liquidation (even in the
unlevered firm) will be optimal at some positive level of the going-concern value.
I assume that the net liquidation value (1 " s)K is less than or equal to
the face value of debt c/r;11 that in the event of liquidation, absolute priority
is respected;12 and that the net liquidation value therefore goes to creditors.13
Formally, the payoffs to debt and equity are as follows:
payoff to equity at t =


(1! τ)(xt ! c)∆, before liquidation if xt∆ " c∆,
0, before liquidation if xt∆ < c∆,
0, at liquidation (final payoff),
(2)
and
payoff to debt at t =


c∆, before liquidation if xt∆ $ c∆,
(1" λ)xt∆, before liquidation if xt∆ < c∆,
(1" s)K, at liquidation (final payoff).
(3)
Note that the liquidation payoff of the equity holder is 0, but that her continu-
ation payoff is always positive. This implies that she will always avoid liquidation
when possible.
A. The Asset Grab Game with No Bankruptcy
In the absence of a bankruptcy procedure that acts as a formal coordination
device, creditors can still recover money by uncoordinated individual legal action.
Suppose that creditors can choose to hire or not to hire a lawyer who tries to
recover money by obtaining a judgment lien against the firm (grabbing or not
grabbing assets), and that the firm is liquidated if a “sufficient” fraction of the
creditors hire lawyers.
Formally, suppose there exists a continuum of creditors with mass 1. Credi-
tors play a stage of the game just before the beginning of each time period t + ∆.
11Since debt is perpetual, there is no payment of principal. Interpreting c/r as the face value of debt
(or principal) in this case is common in the literature (see, e.g., Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997)).
12In practice, absolute priority is typically respected in liquidation, although it is often not respected
in reorganization.
13One can also consider the less interesting case where (1 − s)K > c/r, where the liquidation
payoff to creditors is the full face value c/r, and the liquidation payoff to the equity holder is the
remaining liquidation value after creditors have been paid off, (1 − s)K − c/r. Details are available
from the author.
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Suppose a court agrees to liquidate when the fraction l of creditors who decide
to hire a lawyer and attempt to grab assets is larger than or equal to xt+!/c. This
formulation ensures that it will be impossible for the firm to be forcibly liquidated
when xt+! > c.
All creditors know the cash flow in the previous period t, such that one can
interpret it as public information about the cash flow xt+!, where the precision of
this information is α = (σ2∆)−1. When they are about to play a stage, creditors
also receive a private signal ξi (subscript i indexes the different creditors) about
the value that the cash flow x will take at t + ∆, given by






where Cov(ηt+!, )i) = 0 (i.e., the noise is orthogonal to the innovations in the
cash flow). From the signal ξi and the public information xt, creditors form a
posterior about the cash flow of the firm in period t + ∆. The differences in
posteriors resulting from the differences in the private signal create uncertainty
about the actions of other creditors and hence coordination failure. Once creditors
have formed their posterior, they act.
The following assumptions about timing of the game will allow for derivation
of closed-form valuation formulas via standard techniques, once the continuous-
time limit is taken: Markets open at times t, t + ∆, t + 2∆, . . . , and the asset
grab games are played at some intermediate time periods t + q, (t + ∆) + q, . . . ,
etc., in which markets are closed. Assume that whenever trading occurs, the cash
flow at that time is public information. As a consequence of these timing assump-
tions, only public information will be incorporated into prices (see Figure 1). To
simplify the pricing argument later, one can also assume that coupons or partial




Markets open at times t, t + ∆, . . . , and the asset grab games are played at some intermediate time periods t + q, . . . ,
etc., in which markets are closed.
14One way to interpret these assumptions is the following: During the day (t), trading occurs
and prices reveal all information. In the evening (t + q), markets close. The creditors now receive
private information about the financial situation of the firm (e.g., via a tip-off). They have to decide
immediately whether or not to call their lawyer. If called, a lawyer starts billing his client immediately
and works throughout the night to prepare the papers to be filed. In the morning, before markets open,
all lawyers who have been hired congregate in front of the courthouse; if the number of lawyers is
large, it is clear that the firm will be liquidated. If the firm is not liquidated, when markets open (at
t +"), trading occurs, and prices reveal all private information of creditors.
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Attempting to grab assets produces an immediate cost sK. If the firm is
pushed into liquidation, creditors who have grabbed assets receive the liquida-
tion value (1 " s)K, whereas creditors who have not grabbed assets receive 0.
If the firm is not pushed into liquidation, creditors who have attempted to grab
assets still incur the cost. Table 1 illustrates the instantaneous payoffs that credi-
tors consider (together with any possible payoffs in the future) when making the
decision whether to attempt to grab assets at the intermediate time periods t + q.
TABLE 1
Payoffs to Creditors in the Discrete-Time Game
Payoffs to creditors at the interim stage t + q.
Liquidation No Liquidation
Grab assets (1− s)K −sK
Do not grab assets 0 0
While payoffs assumed here produce the fundamental feature of the game,
which is strategic complementarities, potentially more complicated, and possibly
more realistic payoffs, especially those that depend on the actual fraction of cred-
itors attempting to grab assets, are conceivable. It would, for example, be natural
to argue that in the event of liquidation, assets will first be shared among those
creditors who attempted to grab assets, and all remaining assets will be shared
between those who did not attempt to grab assets. In this kind of setup with one-
sided strategic complementarities (Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)), it is possible
to prove the existence of equilibria in monotone strategies, and uniqueness for
particular structures of noise (Morris and Shin (2003), Goldstein and Pauzner),
but this greatly complicates solutions and does not change the qualitative flavor
of the game. In the continuous-time limit derived later, the payoff does not depend
on the fraction of creditors that attempt to grab assets in any case.
Since creditors maximize expected utility, payoffs will have to be converted
into utility before solving the game. I assume that utility is additively separable
across time, such that expected utility can be decomposed into an instantaneous
(Bernoulli) utility associated with instantaneous payoffs, and a (discounted) con-
tinuation utility associated with future payoffs.15
B. The Asset Grab Game with Bankruptcy
If the costs of attempting to grab assets is low enough, this can lead to unco-
ordinated asset grabs for firms that still have very high cash flows: Any creditor
will worry about all other creditors grabbing and will therefore grab.
Bankruptcy codes attempt to prevent such asset grabs via automatic stays,
preference law, and a policy of equality of distributions to creditors, thus pro-
tecting debtors. For example, part of the stated purpose of preference law in the
United States is the following:
15A specific choice of utility function will imply a specific form for the risk premium #$.
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[B]y permitting the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within
a short period before bankruptcy, creditors are discouraged from racing to the
courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy.16
In practice, firms do apply for protection from their creditors exactly when
these attempt to individually grab assets (LoPucki (1983)). This suggests modify-
ing the game by allowing the equity holder to explicitly put the firm into formal
(Chapter 7-type) bankruptcy, in which case an automatic stay, preference law, and
a policy of equality of distributions to creditors apply.
A modeling issue then is whether the equity holder and creditors should
move simultaneously, or whether either creditors or the equity holder should move
first. In the United States, preference law (United States Code, Title 11, Ch. 5.III
¤ 547) specifies that any preferential transfer that a creditor manages to obtain
in the period up to 90 days before formal bankruptcy can be avoided; that is, if
a creditor manages to grab assets within 90 days before formal bankruptcy, the
grabbed amount has to be returned to the trustee, to be shared equally across
all creditors. This suggests that the equity holder can put the firm into formal
bankruptcy after observing the actions of creditors, but that this move would still
affect the payoffs to creditors.
Suppose, therefore, that just before each time period t + ∆ one now has
the following 2-substage sequential move game: First, creditors decide whether
or not to grab assets. Then, the equity holder decides whether or not to file for
bankruptcy, having observed the actions of all creditors (see Figure 2).
FIGURE 2
Payoffs to Equity in Bankruptcy Game at t + q
First, creditors decide whether or not to grab assets. The equity holder observes whether a sufficient number of creditors
have grabbed assets such that the firm will be liquidated piecemeal (“asset grab”) or not (“no asset grab”), and will decide
to put the firm into bankruptcy or not depending on the given payoffs. As long as the reputational cost is not 0, and the
continuation value is above 0, the equity holder puts the firm into bankruptcy only when an asset grab has happened.
16H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, 177 describing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978. Note that the verb “to avoid” is used here in its legal sense of “to repudiate, nullify, or render
void.”
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A 2nd modeling issue is how to describe the payoffs to the equity holder and
creditors in bankruptcy. If absolute priority is respected in Chapter 7, the pay-
off to the equity holder is 0. In practice, it is likely that an equity holder would
have at least a weak preference for orderly Chapter 7 liquidation over a disorderly
asset grab liquidation (e.g., because of reputational costs associated with the lat-
ter). Suppose that such reputational costs exist, but that they are arbitrarily small.
When a large number of creditors grab assets such that an asset grab liquidation
would result, the equity holder would then file for bankruptcy, since this is weakly
preferred. When a small number of creditors grab assets such that no asset grab
liquidation would result, the equity holder does not file for bankruptcy, since in
this situation the continuation value to equity (which is always positive) is always
higher than the liquidation value (which is 0).
Bankruptcy codes strive to achieve equality of distributions to creditors but
do not necessarily achieve full equality of distributions. For example, preference
law does not prevent all types of prebankruptcy transfers, and requests of the
trustee to return grabbed funds are open to a legal challenge. To model this in a
reduced-form manner, suppose one modifies the payoffs that result from a suc-
cessful asset grab (that now provokes bankruptcy): Assume that creditors who
grabbed assets obtain (1" s)K as before, but assume that creditors who did not
grab assets now obtain (1" ε)(1" s)K, where 0 % ε % 1 (i.e., that payoffs “dif-
fer by an epsilon”).17 The new payoff matrix for creditors, already anticipating
the actions of the equity holder in the 2nd substage, is then given in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Payoffs to Creditors in Bankruptcy Game at t + q
The optimal choice of equity holders in the 2nd stage (put the firm into bankruptcy when there is a successful asset grab)
produces the given payoff matrix for creditors in the 1st stage.
Bankruptcy No Bankruptcy
Grab assets (1− s)K −sK
Do not grab assets (1− ε)(1− s)K 0
If ε= 1, the payoff to creditors who did not grab assets is 0. In this case, the
payoffs are the same as in the asset grab game without bankruptcy codes. (Since
the asset grab game without bankruptcy codes turns out to be a special case, it
will not be necessary to describe its solution separately later.)
If ε = 0, the payoffs to all creditors are the same if the grab is successful
(i.e., bankruptcy codes achieve full equality of distributions). Since creditors who
do not grab assets do not incur legal costs if the asset grab is unsuccessful, not
grabbing assets now is a (weakly) dominant strategy; the incentives to grab assets
therefore are much weaker then before.
For intermediate values of ε, the higher is ε, the larger is the difference
in payoffs for creditors who grab and those who do not grab when the grab is
successful, and the stronger are the incentives to grab assets. In this sense, one
17For example, % could be related to the probability that the bankruptcy trustee successfully chal-
lenges a prebankruptcy transfer.
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can think of ε as measuring the incentives to grab assets produced by a bankruptcy
code.
Chapter 11
A key assumption in the model presented here is that the payoff to the equity
holder in bankruptcy is 0. This a reasonable description of Chapter 7, but not
necessarily of Chapter 11: In Chapter 7, absolute priority is likely to be respected,
whereas in Chapter 11, there are likely to be deviations from absolute priority in
favor of equity holders (Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006), Franks and Torous (1989)).
How would relaxing this assumption affect the model? For situations in
which the bankruptcy payoff to equity holders is positive, the equity holders could
have a motive to voluntarily file for bankruptcy. If this payoff is relatively large,
the equity holder could have a motive to file before an asset grab occurred. In
that case, creditor coordination and features of bankruptcy that affect creditor
coordination would not affect when the firm is put into bankruptcy. Conversely, if
this payoff is relatively small, the equity holders would not have a motive to file
before an asset grab occurred, and the game would work essentially as described
previously.
In this sense, the flavor of the game would not change substantially when
considering Chapter 11 explicitly, as long as Chapter 11 bankruptcy payoffs to
equity holders are small. As noted previously, there is some empirical evidence
that firms are forced to file for bankruptcy precisely when creditors attempt to
individually grab assets (LoPucki (1983)), which suggests that payoffs to equity
holders are small. A more formal examination of Chapter 11 in the context of the
type of model proposed here is likely to be a fruitful area for future research.
III. Solving the Discrete-Time Asset Grab Game
In the repeated game, the continuation utility does not depend on the current
action of an individual creditor, because creditors are atomistic. This implies that
the repeated game can be solved as a series of one-shot games, which greatly
simplifies the analysis.18 I give a summary of the procedure here; for details see
Appendix A.
I solve a single-stage asset grab game using the same procedure as in Morris
and Shin (2004). Suppose that creditors follow a switching strategy (i.e., attempt
to grab assets if their posterior mean over the cash flow is below a critical level).
Given the critical level of the posterior mean, one can work out a critical level
of the cash flow below which a sufficient number of creditors will attempt to
grab, and hence the firm will be liquidated. Given the critical level of the cash
flow, one can work out around which critical level of the posterior mean creditors
will switch. This gives 2 equations in 2 unknowns, which are solved. It can be
shown that an equilibrium in switching strategies in this type of game is the only
18For any creditor for whom the utility of grabbing assets is compared to the utility of not grabbing
assets, the same expression for the continuation utility will appear on both sides of an inequality. The
continuation utility therefore cancels out, and only Bernoulli utilities of instantaneous payoffs matter.
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equilibrium that survives iterated deletion of dominated strategies (see, e.g.,
Morris and Shin (2003)).
Solving the game here is therefore equivalent to finding the critical level of
the cash flow xAG (AG for “asset grabs”), such that when the cash flow falls below
this critical level, a sufficient number of creditors decide to grab assets, and the
firm is liquidated. I show in Appendix A.5 that this critical value of the cash flow
x AGt+! is given by a complicated implicit function, which is not repeated here since
a more easily interpretable expression will be derived later in the continuous-time
limit.
As is standard in this type of game, the equilibrium will be unique, as long as
the private information is “precise enough” in relation to the public information
(see Appendix A.6). Basically, for coordination failure to arise, creditors need
to be sufficiently uncertain about the actions of other creditors. They will only be
uncertain about the actions of other creditors if these actions reflect mostly private
information. The actions will reflect mostly private information if that information
is relatively useful (precise) in relation to public information.
If the private information is “precise enough” and the equilibrium is unique,
it could, for example, be shown that as payoffs to creditors who grab assets and
payoffs to creditors who do not grab assets become more similar (ε decreases), the
critical boundary xAG decreases. The interpretation here is that as the opportunity
cost of not grabbing assets decreases, creditors will be more reluctant to grab
assets, and will do so only for lower cash flows. However, since the solution will
turn out to be much simpler once the continuous-time limit is taken, I delay a
more detailed discussion until Section IV.
IV. Liquidation Decisions in the Continuous-Time Limit
In order to simplify the solution of the game, and also to allow the derivation
of the values of debt, equity, and the firm, I take continuous-time limits. This
will produce a simplified formula for the boundary at which asset grabs happen,
which I discuss in Section IV.A. The closed forms for the values of debt, equity,
and the firm also allow looking at the benchmark case in which creditors choose
a liquidation boundary to maximize the value of debt, which I discuss in Section
IV.B.19 Section IV.C compares the 2 types of liquidation outcomes.
Loosely speaking, in order to take the continuous-time limit, the size of the
time-step ∆ needs to tend to dt. As described in detail in Appendix B, limits
can be taken here in such a way that i) the equilibrium in the game is guaran-
teed to be unique, ii) all creditors grab assets immediately when the cash flow
hits the critical level xAG, iii) the strategic uncertainty of the marginal creditor
over the actions of other creditors (and hence the flavor of the equilibrium in the
game) is preserved, and iv) valuation via standard contingent claims techniques
is possible. Closed forms for the value of debt, equity, and the firm are derived in
Appendix C.
19They will also later allow looking at capital structure that is optimal in the sense of maximizing
firm value.
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A. The Case of Uncoordinated Creditors
In the continuous-time limit, the expression for the critical boundary at which
uncoordinated asset grabs cause a liquidation of the firm is simplified substan-
tially. The following proposition states this critical boundary:
Proposition 1. In the continuous-time limit, the critical level of the cash flow at
which an asset grab occurs is given by
xAG = θc,(5)
where 0 < θ < 1 is given by
θ :=
u((1" s)K)" u((1" ε)(1" s)K)
u((1" s)K)" u((1" ε)(1" s)K) + u(0)" u("sK) .(6)
Proof. See Appendix B. !
This means that in continuous time, the critical level of the cash flow is a
fraction θ of the coupon, where this fraction reflects the utility of grabbing assets
versus the utility of not grabbing assets, both in situations in which the firm is
liquidated and in situations in which it is not liquidated.
Here, xAG is below c. Liquidation of the firm will then happen in the follow-
ing way: As the cash flow falls below c, the firm will begin defaulting on part
of the coupon payments. As the cash flow falls further to xAG, creditors will grab
assets, and the firm will be liquidated.
Now, θ, and hence xAG, is decreasing in s; if it is expensive to hire a lawyer
to file a claim, creditors will be reluctant to attempt to grab assets, and the cash
flow has to be lower before a sufficient number of them act to force liquidation.
Here, θ, and hence xAG is increasing in ε. Lowering ε makes payoffs in
bankruptcy for creditors who grabbed and creditors who did not grab more simi-
lar, and therefore reduces incentives to grab, and consequently reduces the critical
level of the cash flow at which asset grabs occur. As ε tends to 0, not grabbing
assets becomes a (weakly) dominant strategy, illustrating how bankruptcy codes
can prevent asset grabs. If ε > 0, then creditors grab assets at some positive level
of the cash flow, after which the equity holder puts the firm into bankruptcy, as
has been observed to happen in practice (LoPucki (1983)).
B. The Benchmark Case of Coordinated Creditors
With closed-form solutions for the values of debt, equity, and the firm, it
is also possible to consider the benchmark case in which coordinated creditors
choose a liquidation boundary that maximizes the value of debt.20 More generally,
one can consider the liquidation boundaries that maximize either the value of debt,
the value of equity, or the value of the levered firm. I label these as xD, xE, and xV ,
respectively.
20See Appendix C for the formulas for the value of debt, equity, and the firm.
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To maximize the value of debt, coordinated creditors would want to force
liquidation once the cash flow hits xD. They will be able to do so if the firm
is defaulting on coupon payments at this point and the firm has not already been
liquidated by the equity holder. This means that whether or not the firm is actually
liquidated at xD depends on the ordering of xD, xE, and c. The relationship between
these boundaries is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Let xD, xE, and xV denote the liquidation boundaries that maxi-
mize the values of debt, equity, and the firm, respectively. Then
0 = xE < xV < xD % c.(7)
Proof. An intuitive argument for why the proposition holds is as follows:21 Since
the net liquidation proceeds (1 " s)K are assumed to be less than the face value
of debt, and absolute priority is assumed to be respected, the liquidation payoff
to the equity holder is 0, and the liquidation payoff to creditors is equal to the net
liquidation value (1" s)K.
This implies that in liquidation, the equity holder never gains anything, but
always loses a positive continuation value—associated with the possibility that the
cash flow can always return to the region where it exceeds the promised coupon
payment, and that the firm will therefore pay dividends at some point in the future.
Hence the equity holder never wants to liquidate. Mathematically, the value of
equity is maximized for a choice of liquidation boundary xE = 0, which will be
hit with probability 0.
Conversely, in liquidation, creditors do gain a positive liquidation payoff but
lose a positive continuation value. The point at which this gain and loss are traded
off optimally is given by xD. Mathematically, the value of debt is maximized
for a choice of liquidation boundary 0 < xD % c. This is above 0 because the
liquidation payoff is positive, and hence creditors will want to liquidate for very
low cash flows/continuation values. It is below c because the liquidation payoff is
less than the value of receiving the full coupon c forever (c/r), and hence creditors
will not want to liquidate unless the firm is defaulting.22
Since the market value of the firm is defined as the sum of the value of debt
and equity, the liquidation boundary that maximizes this value (xV ) represents
a compromise between what debt holders and equity holders want, and lies in
between the liquidation boundary that maximizes the value of debt (xD) and the
liquidation boundary that maximizes the value of equity (xE). !
Now, xD is below c and above xE. Liquidation of the firm will then happen in
the following way: As the cash flow falls below c, the firm will begin defaulting
on part of the coupon payments. As the cash flow falls further to xD, creditors will
grab assets in a coordinated fashion and cause liquidation. (At this point, equity
holders would prefer continuation, but since the firm is defaulting on part of the
coupon payments, creditors have the legal right to grab assets.)
21A full formal proof is available from the author.
22xD = c exactly when (1− s)K = c/r.
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Compared to the liquidation decision that would maximize the market value
of the firm (xV ), creditors want excessive liquidation. This is because the con-
tinuation value of creditors is lower than the combined continuation value of all
parties.23
C. A Comparison of Coordinated and Uncoordinated Liquidation
In the benchmark case of coordinated creditors, the firm will be liquidated
at too high a cash flow, in the sense that later liquidation would increase the total
value of all claims on the firm.
In the case of uncoordinated creditors, the firm could be liquidated either at
too high a cash flow or at too low a cash flow, depending on the parameter s, the
legal cost of grabbing assets, and the parameter ε, the difference in payoffs in
liquidation between creditors who did grab assets and creditors who did not grab
assets.
If ε and hence the differences in payoffs between creditors who grab and
creditors who do not grab are very large, and/or the legal costs of grabbing assets
are very low, there are very strong incentives to grab assets. In such a situation,
the firm will be liquidated at too high a cash flow. If ε and hence the differences
in payoffs between creditors who grab and creditors who do not grab are very
small, and/or the legal costs of grabbing assets are very high, there are very weak
incentives to grab assets. In such a situation, the firm will be liquidated at too low
a cash flow.
It is possible that a lack of coordination between creditors can actually lead
to better liquidation timing. This is because coordinated creditors always liquidate
too early, whereas uncoordinated creditors might or might not liquidate too early,
depending on the incentives to individually grab assets.
Of course, all of this discussion assumes that Coasian bargaining is not fea-
sible. If it is, then it is clear that liquidation at the firm-value maximizing liqui-
dation point could always be achieved (Haugen and Senbet (1978), Mella-Barral
(1999)). While factors that prevent creditor coordination are likely to also pre-
vent Coasian bargaining, one might think that at least in the case of coordinated
creditors, Coasian bargaining could be feasible. For example, if a firm has bor-
rowed from one bank only, then this bank might accept some delay in liquidation
in exchange for an equity stake.
However, there is at least anecdotal evidence that the kind of premature liqui-
dation described in the coordinated benchmark can occur, suggesting that in prac-
tice things such as, for example, holdup problems, asymmetric information, or
high bargaining costs could be preventing Coasian bargaining from taking place.
For instance, in the United Kingdom, floating charge holders (typically banks)
are a good example of coordinated creditors with strong rights. It has been ar-
gued that there, “the bank may decide against keeping a good company going
because it does not see the upside potential” (Hart (1995), p. 168), or that floating
charge holders “apply themselves ruthlessly to the realization of assets to satisfy
23This is essentially the point made by Hart ((1995), p. 166); the version presented here is a varia-
tion of the version of the argument presented by Naqvi (2008).
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the charge [. . . ] in some cases with scant regard for the future of the company”
(Woolridge (1987)).
V. Liquidation, Capital Structure, and Welfare
This section discusses optimal capital structure choices and a social planner’s
problem: Bankruptcy codes affect how a firm is liquidated and hence affect the
debt-equity trade-off. Also, a social planner could affect bankruptcy codes and
hence indirectly affect the choice of capital structure and, hence, welfare.
In the context of a concrete numerical example, I first discuss how the differ-
ent liquidation boundaries are affected by the level of debt in the firm (as measured
by the coupon c), then discuss how these liquidation mechanisms affect the debt-
equity trade-off and hence capital structure choices, and then consider the social
planner’s problem.
For this exercise, input parameters are chosen as follows: The initial cash
flow is x(0) = 5, the risk-free rate is r = 5%, the rate of growth under the pricing
measure is µ= 3%, the volatility is σ= 20%, the tax parameter is τ = 40%,24 and
the financial distress cost parameter is λ=50%.25 The liquidation value is K=60,
and the legal cost of grabbing assets is s = 10%. (Together, these parameters
imply that it would be optimal to liquidate an unlevered firm once the cash flow
falls to around 1.17.) I assume that investors are approximately risk neutral. This
simplifies the calculation of the liquidation boundary xAG slightly (it will then be
given by xAG = ε(1" s)c/(ε(1" s) + s)).
Later, I will plot liquidation boundaries and firm values against the coupon c.
The coupon will vary between r(1"s)K=2.7, and x(0)=5. For the lowest coupon,
c/r=(1" s)K, and debt is fully collateralized and hence risk free. For the highest
coupon, the company is on the verge of default and hence very risky.
I also allow ε to vary. As argued previously, this parameter measures differ-
ences in payoffs between creditors who grab assets and creditors who do not grab
assets, and hence the strength of incentives to grab assets. (I will consider low,
medium, and high incentives to grab assets: εL = 0, εM = 0.025, εH = 1.)
A. Liquidation Boundaries
Figure 3 plots liquidation boundaries as a function of the coupon. The solid
line corresponds to the liquidation boundary that maximizes the firm value (xV ).
In general, this liquidation boundary can either be increasing or decreasing in c,
depending on the relative size of the tax and distress cost parameters (τ and λ).
There are 2 opposing effects: On the one hand, higher levels of debt increase
the size of the tax shield and hence increase the continuation value of the firm,
which makes later liquidation optimal. On the other hand, higher levels of debt
24Kemsley and Nissim (2002) estimate the debt tax shield to be approximately 40% of debt bal-
ances.
25This implies a reduction in percentage of the gross cash flow that is paid out in distress by 1/6.
To see this, note that the percentage of gross cash flow x that ends up in the hands of equity holders
outside of distress is (1− !)= 60%, and the percentage of gross cash flow x that ends up in the hands
of creditors in distress is (1− &) = 50%.
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increase expected financial distress costs and hence decrease continuation value of
the firm, which makes earlier liquidation optimal. For the given parameters, these
2 effects almost completely neutralize each other, and the boundary is essentially
flat.
FIGURE 3
Liquidation Boundaries as a Function of Coupon
Liquidation boundaries that maximize firm value (xV , solid line) and debt value (xD , dotted line), and liquidation boundaries
that result from asset grabs in the presence of bankruptcy codes (xAG , dashed lines), with varying ε (εL = 0, εM = 0.025,
εH = 1), all as functions of coupon c. Other parameters are as in the main text.
The dotted line corresponds to the liquidation boundary that maximizes the
value of debt (xD). This is always decreasing in c. For low c, the continuation
value of creditors is low in relation to their liquidation payoff (1 " s)K. This
means that they prefer to liquidate early, and hence xD is large. As c increases, the
continuation value of creditors increases, and they therefore prefer to liquidate
later, and hence xD decreases.
Although this is not plotted here, the liquidation boundary that maximizes
the value of equity (xE) is flat at 0, because the continuation value of the equity
holder is always positive, but the liquidation payoff of the equity holder is 0. One
can see that the boundaries xD, xV , and xE satisfy xE < xV < xD % c as suggested
by Proposition 2.
The dashed lines correspond to the liquidation boundaries that result from
asset grabs when bankruptcy codes affect the interaction of creditors (xAG) for
low, medium, and high incentives to grab assets (εL=0, εM=0.025, εH=1). It can
be seen that for the larger incentives to grab assets (larger ε), the corresponding
boundary lies higher. Also, the boundaries with positive ε (i.e., with εM and εH)
are increasing functions of c. This is because the game essentially determines the
fraction of the coupon on which the firm can default before creditors grab (i.e.,
the liquidation boundary is a fraction of the coupon).
B. Optimal Capital Structure
In the context of the numerical example, one can now discuss optimal capital
structure in the ex ante sense of Leland (1994); that is, one can consider the owner
of an all-equity firm that wants to exit by selling debt and equity in proportions
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that maximize the overall proceeds of the sale, taking a liquidation mechanism as
given. The choice of capital structure in this context is synonymous with a choice
of the level of coupon c.
In the model, there is a trade-off as in standard trade-off theory: Increasing
the level of debt c increases the size of the tax shield, but it also increases expected
financial distress costs. Here, however, there is an additional effect of c on firm
value, which is via liquidation boundaries.
Figure 4 shows the firm values for different liquidation boundaries. The solid
line corresponds to a firm that is liquidated at the firm-value maximizing liquida-
tion boundary (at xV ). The firm value is maximized in this case for a coupon of
c & 4.2.26
FIGURE 4
Firm Values as a Function of Coupon
Firm values (measured as fraction of maximum attainable firm value) as a function of coupon c, for different liquidation
boundaries: firm value for liquidation at xV (solid line), firm value for liquidation at xD (dotted line), and several firm values
for liquidation at xAG corresponding to different ε, as in Figure 3.
The dotted line corresponds to a firm that is liquidated at the debt-value max-
imizing liquidation boundary (at xD). One can see that first, the firm value in this
case is lower for all c. This is because in this case, the firm is liquidated very early,
which decreases firm value. Second, one can see that the firm value in this case
is maximized for a higher coupon of around c & 4.6. This is because increasing
c here has the additional effect of decreasing xD, bringing it closer to firm-value
maximizing liquidation boundary xV (see Figure 3).
The dashed lines correspond to a firm that is liquidated as a result of asset
grabs, in the presence of bankruptcy codes (xAG), for various values of ε. One can
see that for a high εH (high incentives to grab assets), the resulting very early asset
grabs produce a low firm value. Also, firm value in this case is maximized for a
26Since xV is defined as the x that satisfies 'V/'x=0, one knows that the total derivative dV/d x=
'V/'c + ('V/'x)'x/'c= 'V/'c at this point. The 1st-order condition associated with maximizing
V therefore only considers the partial derivative 'V/'c, so in this sense, if the firm is liquidated at
xV , only a standard trade-off (effect of c on V via tax advantage and expected financial distress cost)
is considered, and the effect of c on the liquidation boundary has no effect on the optimal choice of c.
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very low c. This is because decreasing c has the additional effect of decreasing
xAG, bringing it closer to the firm-value maximizing liquidation boundary xV (see
Figure 3).
For a low εL (= 0, which implies no incentives to grab assets), one can see
that the resulting very late asset grabs produce a higher firm value. Also, firm
value in this case is maximized for a c very close to the c that maximizes firm
value in the case in which the firm is liquidated at xV . This is because adjusting c
has no effect on xAG, just as adjusting c has (almost) no effect on xV (see Figure 3).
Lastly, for an intermediate εM , one can see that even higher firm values can
be achieved. For the particular value of ε here (εM = 0.025), firm value in this
case is maximized for a slightly higher coupon than in the case where the firm is
liquidated at xV . This is because increasing c again has the additional effect of in-
creasing xAG, bringing it closer to the firm-value maximizing liquidation boundary
xV (see Figure 3).
The previous argument suggests that when the firm is liquidated at xAG, the
optimal level of debt (c) is nonmonotonic in ε, the parameter that describes the
differences in payoffs of creditors who grab assets and creditors who do not grab
assets and hence describes the incentives to grab assets. As it turns out, this non-
monotonicity of the optimal c in ε also implies that optimal leverage (D/E) of a
firm is nonmonotonic in ε, as illustrated in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5
Optimal Leverage as a Function of %
Optimal leverage (optimal D/E) as a function of the parameter ε that describes the differences in payoffs between creditors
who grab assets and creditors who do not grab assets, and hence the incentives to grab assets, as achieved by bankruptcy
codes.
This is a potentially testable implication of the model. Consider, for example,
the “creditor rights score” proposed by La Porta et al. (1998) and used in much
subsequent work. This score is based in part on whether creditors are subject to
an automatic stay (higher score if they are not). Being subject to an automatic
stay or not affects incentives to grab assets, which in the context of the model
are described by the parameter ε. The analysis here suggests that the relation-
ship between a “creditor rights” score and leverage might very well be nonmono-
tonic: Very weak “creditor rights” make debt unattractive and make low leverage
Bruche 1427
optimal. Medium “creditor rights” make debt more attractive and make higher
leverage optimal. Very strong “creditor rights” can lead to very early asset grabs,
which make debt less attractive and make low leverage optimal.
C. A Social Planner
One can now ask the question, “How would a social planner optimally adjust
bankruptcy law to maximize welfare?” A social planner could, for example, ad-
just features of bankruptcy codes such as preference law to adjust the incentives to
grab assets, and hence liquidation timing (the parameter ε), and hence the choice
of capital structure, and hence welfare.
A key question in this context is how welfare should be measured. A social
planner is likely to care about firm values. However, a social planner is also likely
to care about the (expected) tax revenues raised from firms. In a fully fledged
discussion, one could set up a formal problem where the objective of the social
planner is, for example, to maximize firm value subject to the constraint that a cer-
tain amount of tax revenues has to be raised. Reasonable choice variables in such
a problem could be tax rates, and the parameter ε that describes incentives to grab
assets. In general, this would lead to a welfare function in which the social planner
implicitly attaches different (positive) weights to firm value and tax revenues.
Even without such a fully fledged discussion, it is possible to make some
statement about which values of ε a social planner would not want: One can
consider how different ε lead to different combinations of both firm value and
tax revenues (taking the tax parameter τ as given), and find those that are Pareto
dominated. For such combinations, welfare can always be improved, regardless of
the precise weights on firm value and tax revenues, as long as these are positive.
Essentially, a social planner would choose combinations that lie on an “efficient
frontier,” as in Figure 6.
FIGURE 6
Firm Values and Tax Revenues
Combinations of firm value and tax revenues traced out by varying ε ∈ [0, 0.1]. The solid line denotes Pareto-dominating
combinations (ε ! 0.04), and the dotted line denotes Pareto-dominated combinations (ε " 0.04).
As it turns out, for the given parameters, low values of ε produce Pareto-
dominated combinations of firm value and tax revenues (dotted part of the line
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in Figure 6). Why is this? For very low ε, liquidation happens very late, and
firm values are low. For slightly higher ε, liquidation happens earlier, and firm
values can be higher. Earlier liquidation reduces expected tax revenues, ceteris
paribus, since no taxes are paid after the firm has been liquidated. However, earlier
liquidation can make lower debt levels optimal, which decreases the tax shield,
increasing expected tax revenues.
From a practical perspective, this indicates that bankruptcy codes that achieve
(close to) full equality of distributions to creditors, and hence produce very small
incentives to grab assets, can lead to low welfare.
VI. Conclusion
This paper presents a continuous-time structural model in which defaulting
firms are liquidated when creditors attempt to enforce claims against these firms.
It considers how the values of debt, equity, and the firm are affected by the actions
of coordinated creditors and uncoordinated creditors. In the case of uncoordinated
creditors, the effect of features of (Chapter 7-type) bankruptcy codes such as au-
tomatic stays, preference law, and policies of equality of distributions that affect
creditor coordination are also discussed. Closed-form solutions are derived for the
values of debt, equity, and the firm.
In the model, coordinated creditors can have incentives to liquidate prema-
turely, in the sense that firm value would be higher if the firm was liquidated later.
Uncoordinated creditors care about payoffs in an asset grab game. If legal costs of
grabbing assets are low, they can have incentives to grab assets too early. Features
of Chapter 7-type bankruptcy codes that affect creditor coordination (automatic
stays, preference law, policies of equality of distribution) change the payoffs in
the asset grab game such that grabbing assets becomes less attractive, protecting
debtors. This leads to later liquidation.
The level of debt has an effect on when the firm is liquidated, both in the
case in which creditors are coordinated as well as in the case where creditors are
uncoordinated. This means that debt levels should ideally be adjusted to improve
liquidation timing. The paper shows how this motive for adjusting debt levels can
interact with a standard debt-equity trade-off of a tax advantage versus expected
financial distress costs.
Since the strength of incentives for asset grabs produced by bankruptcy codes
affects the sensitivity of liquidation timing to debt levels, it affects the optimal
capital structure decision. In the model, optimal leverage can be first increasing
and then decreasing in the strength of incentives to grab assets, suggesting that in
empirical comparisons, the relationship between “creditor rights” (La Porta et al.
(1998)) and capital structure can be nonmonotonic.
Finally, one can consider the problem of a social planner that decides to ad-
just the strength of incentives to grab assets to maximize welfare. As long as the
welfare function attaches positive weight to both firm values and tax revenues,
very weak incentives to grab assets (produced, e.g., by automatic stays com-
bined with a strong policy of equality of distributions to creditors) can be subop-
timal: Low incentives to grab mean very late liquidation. Increasing incentives to
grab assets means earlier liquidation. This can increase firm values. In addition,
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although it reduces expected tax revenues ceteris paribus (because no taxes are
paid once the firm is liquidated), it can decrease optimal leverage, which decreases
the tax shield and hence increases expected taxes ceteris paribus. So earlier liqui-
dation can increase both firm values and expected tax revenues.
Appendix A. Solution of the Asset Grab Game
1. Basic Procedure
The solution procedure for a single stage of the discrete-time repeated game is the
same as that of Morris and Shin (2004). Suppose that creditors follow a switching strategy
around a certain posterior belief. Given the posterior belief around which creditors switch,
it is possible to derive the critical next-period cash flow for which the firm will be liq-
uidated. Given a critical cash flow for which the firm will be liquidated, it is possible to
derive the belief around which creditors switch. This produces 2 equations in 2 unknowns,
which can then be solved for the critical cash flow for which the firm is liquidated.
2. Posteriors
Given the assumptions on the information structure in the main text, posteriors can
be worked out as follows: From the signal ξi and the public information xt, creditors form
a posterior about the cash flow in period t +∆, xt+∆ that is normal, with mean and variance
given by







3. Critical Value of xt+∆ for Which the Firm Is Liquidated
Suppose creditors follow a switching strategy around ρ∗ (i.e., creditors grab assets
when their posterior mean is below ρ∗). Then a creditor will not grab assets if and only if






(1 + (µ + σνt)∆)xt.(A-2)
Conditional on state xt+∆, the distribution of ξi is normal with mean xt+∆ and pre-







, where Φ(á) is the cumulative standard normal density func-
tion. The fraction of creditors that grab assets will be equal to this ex ante probability for
any individual creditor by some version of the law of large numbers.
Since the firm fails if the fraction that grabs assets is l " xt+∆/c, the critical value of























ρ∗ ! x AGt+∆
))}
.(A-3)
4. Critical Value of ρ around Which Creditors Switch
Payoffs in a stage of the game are as described in the payoff matrix in the main text.
Creditors will switch if they believe that they will obtain a higher utility from doing
so. One finds the critical ρ∗ around which creditors switch by considering the marginal
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creditor, for whom the expected utility of not grabbing assets should just equal the expected
utility of grabbing assets.
Let F denote the posterior cumulative distribution (given the belief) over the cash
flow xt+∆, let u(á) denote the (Bernoulli) utility function that maps instantaneous payoffs
into instantaneous utility, let δ be the subjective discount factor, and let UL and UNL denote
the future utility associated with the firm being liquidated and not liquidated in the current
period, respectively. Then for the marginal creditor,
∫ x AGt+∆
−∞


























The terms in UL and UNL cancel, since future payoffs do not depend on the actions of
an individual creditor. Also, since the Bernoulli utilities do not depend on x directly, one
can move them out of the integrals to obtain
u((1! s)K) Pr
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u((1! ε)(1! s)K) Pr
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xt+∆ $ x AGt+∆
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u((1! s)K)! u((1! ε)(1! s)K)
u((1! s)K)! u((1! ε)(1! s)K) + u(0)! u(!sK)(A-4)
:= θ,
where θ is defined by this expression. Note that θ= ε(1! s)/(ε(1! s)+ s) when creditors
are risk neutral.













∗ ! x AGt+∆
)}
,(A-5)
where Φ(á) denotes the cumulative normal density function.
One can equate expressions (A-5) and (A-4) to obtain
ρ




5. Solving for x AGt+∆
Combining expressions (A-6) and (A-3), one can solve for the critical level of the

































Proof. This is a version of the proof in Morris and Shin (2004). A sufficient condition for
a unique solution is that the slope of the right-hand side (RHS) of equation (A-7), seen as






















The standard normal density reaches a maximum of 1/
#
2pi at 0, hence a sufficient con-




β)(1/xt) < 1, as stated in expression
(A-8). !
This type of condition is standard for this type of game. Basically, for coordination
failure to arise, creditors need to be sufficiently uncertain about the actions of other credi-
tors. They will only be uncertain about the actions of other creditors if these actions reflect
mostly private information. The actions will reflect mostly private information if that in-
formation is relatively useful (precise) in relation to public information. Mathematically,
this means that the ratio α/
#
β has to be “relatively low.”
7. Uncertainty in the Limit
Conditional on the cash flow in the next period, the probability that a creditor receives




β (ξ∗t ! xt+∆)
)
. It is easily seen that
this tends either to 0 or 1 as β %&, depending on whether the critical level of the signal
ξ∗t is below or above the cash flow xt+∆. Hence creditors will either all grab assets or all
refrain from doing so.
However, in the continuous-time limit, the marginal creditor (the creditor who re-
ceives a signal ξt = ξ∗t ) views the fraction of creditors that attempt to grab assets as a
random variable that is uniformly distributed (i.e., the marginal creditor is completely un-
certain about this fraction). It is in this sense that strategic uncertainty remains present in
the limit. This is a special case of a general result in coordination failure games in which
the precision of private information goes to infinity. The general result is discussed in more
detail, for example, in Morris and Shin (2003).
Lemma 2. The belief of the marginal creditor over the fraction that attempt to grab assets
l is uniform in the limit.








What is the probability that a fraction less than y of the other bondholders receive a signal
higher than that of the marginal creditor, conditional on the marginal creditor’s signal, or
what is Pr ((1! l) < y | ξ∗)?
The event 1 ! l < y is equivalent to the event 1 ! Φ{(#β/xt) (ξ∗ ! xt+∆)}
< y or (rearranging) xt+∆ < ξ∗ + (xt/
#
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The posterior of the marginal creditor over xt+∆ has mean ρ∗ and variance x2t /
(α + β), hence this probability is








Φ−1 {y} ! ρ∗
)}
.(A-12)
Now as one takes limits, ρ∗ % ξ∗, since private information becomes infinitely more
precise than public information (the creditor attaches all weight to the signal and none to
the mean of the prior), and#α + β/#β % 1. It follows that
Pr ((1! l) < y | ρ∗) = y,(A-13)
so the cumulative distribution of 1!l is the identity function, which implies that the density
of 1! l, and hence also l, will be uniform. !
Appendix B. The Continuous-Time Limit
The process given in expression (1) is a Euler discretization of the stochastic differ-
ential equation
dx(t) = (µ + σν(t)) x(t)dt + σx(t)dW(t).(B-1)
Consequently, if one takes limits as ∆% 0, the solution of the discretization (1) will con-
verge both weakly (with order 1) and strongly (with order 0.5) to the solution of equation
(B-1) (see, e.g., Kloeden and Platen (2000)).
The variance σ2∆ needs to be O(∆) as it tends to 0, and the precision α= (σ2∆)−1
needs to be O (1/∆) as it tends to infinity. It is noted in Appendix A.6 that the critical









Obviously, if the precision of public information α goes to infinity, a necessary condition
for the equilibrium to be unique as described previously is that the precision of private
information β also goes to infinity. A sufficient condition for the equilibrium to be unique
as described previously is that the precision of private information β goes to infinity, but at
a rate faster than 1/∆2 (i.e., that 1/β = o (∆2)), such that α/#β tends to 0.










β % 1. This, in turn, implies that the limit of expression (A-7) becomes
xAG = θc, as stated in Proposition 1. !
It remains to show that this limiting solution can be appropriately used for pricing.
First, it will be necessary to describe the payoffs to creditors, and second, it will be neces-
sary to describe the information set (filtration) on the basis of which prices will be formed.
One notes that in the limit, as β %&, the probability that a creditor receives a signal
that prompts her to grab assets will tend to either 0 or 1 (Appendix A.7). What this means
is that because creditors essentially all receive the same information (as the signal becomes
infinitely precise), creditors will either all grab assets or will all refrain from doing so. For
any creditor, the ex ante probability of grabbing assets when the other creditors do not
tends to 0. Also, the probability of not grabbing assets if all other creditors are grabbing
assets tends to 0. In the limit, creditors receive the same signals, and there is no uncertainty
about the cash flow. However, as shown in Appendix A.7, strategic uncertainty remains in
the sense that the marginal creditor, that is, the creditor who receives a signal such that
the posterior mean is equal to the critical posterior mean around which creditors switch,
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has maximum uncertainty about the actions of other creditors. Hence the quality of the
equilibrium is preserved in the limit. At the same time, since in equilibrium the creditors
act in unison, the payoffs are the same for all creditors and are essentially as described in
Section II.
Also, due to the timing assumptions, no private information is available at the time at
which prices are formed. The filtration relevant for pricing here will be that generated by
the cash flow process x(t).
Appendix C. Valuation
The valuation problem here is one of working out the values of the payoffs as de-
scribed in Section II, contingent on the cash flow x(t), for a given liquidation boundary x.
One can first change to the pricing measure Q defined by the money market account. The
differential of the cash flow x(t) can be expressed in terms of a Brownian motion under
this measure as
dx(t) = µx(t)dt + σx(t)d ˜W(t),(C-1)
where d ˜W(t) := dW(t) + νdt.
In general, for any value (value of debt, equity, or the firm), there will be formulas for
2 regions, 1 for the region where the firm is not defaulting on promised coupon payments
(x(t) " c), and 1 for the region where the firm is defaulting on part of the promised coupon
payments (x(t) < c).
Within a region, the method for solving the valuation problem is standard (see, e.g.,
Dixit (1993)). Let F(x) denote the value of a perpetual claim to flow payoffs of the type
a + bx, where x is an Ito process, and a, b are constants. Then requiring that the discounted
gains process associated with the claim is a martingale underQ produces a pricing ordinary
differential equation (ODE). For a differential of the cash flow x(t) as in equation (C-1),
the ODE will have the form
1
2
σ2x2F′′(x) + µxF′(x) + a + bx = rF(x).(C-2)
Solutions to this ODE have the form





where A and B are constants of integration to be determined via boundary conditions, and
δ > 1 and !γ < 0 are the positive and negative roots, respectively, of the characteristic
equation of the ODE, and are therefore functions of µ,σ, and r. Since there are 2 regions
per claim, there are 4 constants of integration per claim.
Let D1(x) denote the value of debt in the no default region, and let D2(x) denote the
value of debt in the default region. To obtain the 4 constants of integration, one can apply











D2(x) = (1! s)K.(C-7)
Expression (C-4) states that as the cash flow becomes very large, debt essentially becomes
riskless. Expression (C-5) is a value-matching condition that states that at the point where
the dynamics of the discounted gains process change (when the cash flow is just equal to
the coupon), the value of the solution to both differential equations has to be the same.
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Expression (C-6) is required to rule out arbitrage as the cash flow falls below the coupon
(see, e.g., Dixit (1993)), and expression (C-7) is another value-matching condition that
states that when the firm is liquidated, the price of debt must be equal to the liquidation
payoff.
Let D1 denote the value of debt in the no default region, and let D2 denote the value
of debt in the default region. Applying the 4 boundary conditions, the 4 constants of inte-



















































Let E1 denote the value of equity in the no default region, and let E2 denote the value

















The interpretation of these boundary conditions is obvious, and parallels that of the bound-


















































for the value of debt in the default region.
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Finally, the value of the firm can be calculated as the sum of the value of debt and the
value of equity, in each region:
















































A = (1! τ)Z(c)! Z((1! λ)c).(C-19)
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